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The Inevitable Deservingness Gap 
A Study into the Insurmountable Immigrant Penalty  





With the asylum crisis in tandem with the Great Recession hitting European societies, concerns about 
declining support for equal welfare provision to immigrants grow. Albeit studies on welfare 
deservingness show that immigrants are deemed least entitled to welfare compared to other target 
groups, they have fallen short to isolate welfare claimants’ identity (i.e. foreign origin) to rivaling 
deservingness criteria that might explain the immigrant deservingness gap. This paper studies the 
importance of welfare claimants’ foreign origin relative to other theoretically relevant deservingness 
criteria via a unique vignette experiment among 23,000 Dutch respondents about their preferred levels 
of unemployment benefits. We show that foreign origin is among the three most important conditions 
for reduced solidarity, after labor-market reintegration behavior (reciprocity) and culpability for 
unemployment (control). Further, favorable criteria do not close the gap between immigrants and 
natives in perceived deservingness, emphasizing the difficulty to overcome the immigrant penalty in 







Over the last years, concerns with immigration and tenability of (support for) the welfare state – 
dubbed as the Progressive Dilemma (Goodhart, 2004) – have hit a new high in the face of the refugee 
crisis in tandem with the Great Recession. Welfare chauvinism – favouring welfare redistribution 
among the native in-group while excluding out-groups from welfare – is well-established (Kitschelt, 
1997). Public opinion assumes that immigrants take out more from the welfare state than they 
contribute to it (de Koster et al., 2013). Consequently, immigrants are perceived as least deserving of 
welfare provision compared to a range of other target groups (van Oorschot 2000, 2006a), causing 
citizens to impede immigrants’ access to welfare (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012).  
 
Despite increased attention to welfare chauvinism (Harell et al., 2016; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012; 
Ford, 2016), survey research has insufficiently addressed this concept by neglecting variation between 
immigrants. Findings tend to treat immigrants incorrectly as a homogenous group whose 
deservingness is perceived without differentiation (van Oorschot, 2000; 2006a). This paper challenges 
this proposition by studying (1) to what extent immigrants are penalized for their identity as immigrants 
in comparison to other relevant deservingness criteria; and (2) whether they are able to overcome the 
expected immigrant penalty via favourable attributes, so that support for their welfare entitlement is 
(more) equal to natives. 
 
A first crucial question is whether immigrants’ identity as persons of foreign origin itself serves as a 
penalty that explains suppressed solidarity from natives, or whether other unfavourable attributes that 
are associated with foreign origin contribute to their lowest perceived deservingness. Van Oorschot 
(2000, 2006a) introduced four other deservingness criteria, namely claimants’ need for benefits, control 
over social risks, reciprocity to contributors, and attitude towards received support (see also van Oorschot 
et al., 2017). Immigrants generally fare worse on these criteria, which eventually may drive the 
supposed immigrant penalty. For instance, immigrants’ recent arrival and socioeconomic vulnerability 
induce shorter and more inconsistent labour market trajectories (Kogan, 2006). Immigrants, 
particularly from non-EU countries (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014), therefore have averagely made 
comparatively lower contributions to the welfare state (Boeri et al., 2002) and put eventually pressure 
on welfare state spending (Soroka et al., 2016), which might lower their perceived deservingness (see 
Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). 
 
The second crucial question is whether and to what extent immigrants are able to overcome such 
immigrant penalty to make them be perceived as equally deserving of welfare benefits as native 
claimants with similar deservingness attributes. Some suggest that the deservingness gap of ethnic 
outgroups is inevitable (Allport 1954; Gilens 1999), others that the gap can and should be overcome 
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in exceptional conditions (Peffley et al., 1997). In this respect, recent survey evidence proposes that a 
plurality of Europeans is inclined to grant immigrants equal access to welfare only after they have 
worked and paid taxes for a considerable time (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). While this suggests 
that the immigrant penalty can be overcome, it is not a true test as surveys fail to contrast favourable 
and unfavourable immigrant welfare claimants with similarly favourable and unfavourable native 
claimants. 
 
Our study is not the first to isolate identity from other deservingness criteria (see Hainmueller & 
Hopkins, 2015; Ford, 2016; Harell et al., 2016; Hjorth, 2016; Kootstra, 2016). We do not only advance 
by aligning to the deservingness literature (van Oorschot et al., 2017). Further, whereas earlier studies 
tended to employ a within-person vignette experiment, we opted for a between-person design, in 
which each respondent is offered only one, randomly constituted vignette. Between-person vignette 
experiments are less likely to suffer from rationalization or harmonization of responses than the 
within-person design. However, this benefit comes at a cost: a between-person vignette experiment 
requires a large set of vignettes and respondents.  
 
We therefore set up a large-scale survey vignette experiment covering 3,672 randomly constituted 
vignettes offered to a total of 23,015 respondents. The experiment is conducted in the Netherlands, 
which – similar to many other European Union member states – has been subjected to austerity during 
the Great Recession. Traditional welfare arrangements have come under pressure, shifting towards 
the paradigm of a ‘participation society’ (Knijn & Hopman, 2015). Concurrently, immigration has 
belonged to the most salient political issues since 2002 (Pellikaan et al., 2007). The present study asks 
about support for unemployment provisions for specific unemployed welfare claimants with varying 
theoretically relevant attributes. Not only is unemployment provision an important aspect of social 
protection (Pierson, 1996), support for labour market policies that specifically benefit immigrants is 
waning, too (Brady & Finnigan, 2014). Randomizing attributes over vignettes and vignettes over 
respondents allows to completely pull apart the relative importance of each attribute, as well as to 
study how they interact.  
 
Our findings show a sizeable and inevitable gap in the perceived deservingness of immigrants 
compared to natives. The identity criterion plays a strong role in the perceived deservingness of welfare 
claimants; only control and reciprocity have a stronger influence. Moreover, this deservingness gap is 
inevitable: even the most positive attributes of unemployed welfare claimants are not able to annul the 






2. Theorizing Immigrants’ Perceived Welfare Deservingness 
 
2.1. Deservingness Criteria and the Immigrant Welfare Beneficiary 
 
Why some are perceived as more deserving of welfare than others depends on so-called deservingness 
‘heuristics’, i.e. “decision rules that produce quick judgments based on limited information and, hence, 
allow for opinion formation even when substantive information is absent” (Petersen et al., 2010, p. 
26). These heuristics boil down to five criteria (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006a): need, identity, control, 
reciprocity and attitude, and provide citizens with rivalling cues whether or not to consider target 
groups as deserving. This particularly holds for immigrants. Evidently, the need criterion postulates 
that those with social needs, particularly beyond current encountered risk, are met with more 
sympathy. Immigrants generally accumulate disadvantages, i.e., they are more vulnerable on the labour 
market (Kogan, 2006) and have weaker health outcomes (Moullan & Jusot, 2014). By contrast, they 
are generally perceived as undeserving of welfare (van Oorschot, 2006a). 
 
The immigrant penalty therefore might reflect a myriad of deservingness criteria. Prominently, the 
identity-condition supposes that perceived deservingness depends on being considered as ‘one of us’ 
(van Oorschot, 2000): solidarity declines with cultural distance (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015). This 
insight builds on the homophily-argument: people generally prefer others similar to them (McPherson 
et al., 2002). Regarding the other criteria, control (or by Cook (1979) described as ‘locus of 
responsibility’) predicts that those individually responsible over their needy situation are perceived as 
less deserving (see also Larsen, 2008), for instance being fired because of an unprofessional work ethos 
(internal locus of responsibility) compared to being sacked because of an economic downturn 
(external locus of responsibility). Reciprocity suggests that perceived deservingness depends upon the 
extent one has ‘earned’ support (van Oorschot, 2000), e.g. by having contributed to the generation of 
welfare by having worked continuously. Finally, attitude describes that perceived deservingness is 
higher for groups that are thankful and grateful for the received support (van Oorschot, 2000).  
 
Particularly immigrants’ welfare deservingness combines several attributes that are difficult to unravel 
by conventional research methods (e.g. van Oorschot, 2006a). E.g. for reciprocity, evidence suggests 
higher support for welfare equal to natives for immigrants who have contributed by working and 
paying taxes (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). Immigrants are, however, disadvantaged, as they often 
have incomplete employment trajectories in their destination country (Kogan, 2006). Further, public 
opinion assumes immigrants have an opportunistic attitude to the welfare state (de Koster et al., 2013). 
Additionally, control can be invoked for explaining motives for migration: political refugees tend to 
receive more sympathy, making them perceived as more deserving than economic migrants (O’Rourke 
& Sinnott, 2006) because they migrated for motives beyond their control. Combined, these examples 
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clearly show the importance of isolating immigrants’ identity from other relevant deservingness 
attributes which might coincide with their foreign origin and drive down perceived deservingness. 
 
2.2. What Deservingness Criteria Matter Most? 
 
As immigrants averagely tend to combine several unfavourable deservingness criteria, it is important 
to pull these apart before studying whether favourable attributes are able to overcome the supposed 
deservingness gap. Doing so will also reveal the relative importance of each deservingness criterion. 
Surprisingly, no empirical evidence exists that documents which criteria matter more in perceived 
deservingness. The main reason lies in data restrictions: existing survey studies did not allow for a 
simultaneous test that isolates the importance of foreign origin relative to other relevant deservingness 
criteria. The design proposed in this study overcomes this problem. 
 
In line with arguments regarding the “Moral Foundation of the Welfare State” (Mau, 2003), we can 
expect that public opinion on welfare deservingness reflects social policies. Social policies were 
originally designed to grant citizens social rights (Marshall, 2009 [1950]) that allowed them to enjoy 
and share “at least a basic level of social-economic and cultural well-being” (Cohen, 2010, p. 81). The 
economic upsurge after the Second World War caused the implementation of welfare policies to 
protect citizens against misuses from the market; recent policy innovations, however, shifted focus “to 
‘empower’ people in order to integrate them into the market” (Cantillon & van Lancker, 2012, p. 659). 
The underlying principles for this shift are reciprocity and control. Giddens’ (1998, p. 65) third-way 
politics emphasizes “no rights without responsibilities,” implying that unemployment benefits can be 
claimed only by those who – quid pro quo – are willing to reintegrate into the labour market. Particularly 
in health policy, the transition towards the privatization of social risks is most apparent (Pintelon et 
al., 2013; van Oorschot, 2006b)1; this transition is also clear in the provision of unemployment 
benefits, with limited access to benefits in case of instant dismissal because of poor performance. 
 
This welfare state paradigm shift also applies to the Dutch welfare state, as it has encountered “a 
principled shift from a system based on collective solidarity towards one predominantly on individual 
solidarity” (van Oorschot 2006b, p. 58). Albeit being characterized as a hybrid case between the social-
democrat and conservative regime (Arts & Gelissen, 2002), an emphasis on individual control in terms 
of the privatization of risks is recognized (Snel et al., 2008). This transformation culminated in the 
political rhetoric of the ‘participation society’, i.e. the idea that government should become less 
responsible in dealing with social risks, while social initiatives should prevail (see Knijn & Hopman, 
                                                 
1 E.g. the idea that health care access should be limited to those who commit unhealthy behaviour; for example lung 
transplant after continuing smoking in spite of several warnings. 
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2015). At the same time, social policy prohibits distinguishing between natives and immigrants, for as 
long as immigrants have residency status. Although public opinion might perceive immigrants as 
undeserving (van der Waal et al., 2010) and despite the ongoing politicization of immigration after 
2002 (Pellikaan et al., 2007), social policies treat immigrants similarly as native-borns. 
 
Following the argument that social policy and public opinion interact (Mau, 2003), we can expect that 
reciprocity and control are important deservingness criteria that influence perceptions of who should 
be entitled to generous welfare provision. The fact that immigrants are perceived as least deserving 
social risk group (van Oorschot, 2006a) further suggests that identity as deservingness is by itself highly 
relevant, too. For two criteria – need and attitude – we have lower expectations because the universal 
character of Dutch welfare provision downplays them (but see De Swaan (1988) who more generally 
formulated strong theoretical expectations), i.e. means-tests do not apply for the provision of 
unemployment benefits, and being thankful for the received benefits is not asked for. 
 
2.3. Overcoming the Immigrant Penalty 
 
Isolating identity from other relevant criteria enables responding to the question whether favourable 
deservingness criteria are able to close or even annul the immigrant penalty. Are immigrants who 
deviate from these unfavourable conditions, for instance by looking for a job during unemployment, 
perceived as equally – or at least more equally – deserving of welfare as similar native claimants?  
 
On the one hand, the literature provides little reason to be hopeful. Insights from social psychology 
show that changing existing stereotypes is extremely difficult. This ‘inevitability of prejudice’-
explanation (Allport, 1954; Billig, 1985) proposes that negative sentiments towards out-groups flow 
from social categorization – stereotyping. Further, automatic stereotyping can only be mitigated if 
people are motivated to do so (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and depend upon cognitive resources (Gilbert 
& Hixon, 1991). Particularly the American cliché of the ‘black welfare queen’ (Gilens, 1999) 
exemplifies this psychological model: the racialization of welfare recipients seems to inhibit social 
solidarity at large (Harell et al., 2016). The ‘inevitability of prejudice’-account therefore suggests that 
offering counter-stereotypical deservingness conditions will not reward immigrants more than natives; 
gaps in perceived deservingness remain persistent. 
 
Alternatively, some studies challenge this automatic activation of stereotypes by arguing that the first 
stage of stereotyping is followed by deliberate considerations of the stereotype (Devine, 1989), which 
is facilitated by providing counter-stereotypical information. In one of the few experimental studies 
on racialized welfare preferences, Peffley, Hurwitz and Sniderman (1997) offered more than 2,000 
white respondents questions about how welfare deserving whites, blacks, but also immigrants are. The 
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finding was that if individuated information on blacks confirm stereotypical expectations, whites 
oppose welfare provisions more strongly than for a white welfare claimant with the same attribute. 
Alternatively, if the information counters their existing stereotypes, whites are far more likely to 
support welfare provisions, in some cases even more than for whites under the same condition.2 As 
the authors argue (1997, p. 45), “[f]rom the perspective of whites with a disparaging view of blacks, 
then, blacks who try hard are an exception, and in consequence, deserve to be treated exceptionally 
well.”  
 
Immigration has become increasingly politicized in Europe (Kriesi et al., 2006), and particularly in the 
Netherlands (Pellikaan et al., 2007). Inspired by few studies on welfare chauvinism (Reeskens & van 
Oorschot, 2012), we align to Peffley et al. (1997). Briefly put, we expect that in case of unfavourable 
stereotype-confirming conditions (i.e. negative attributes), immigrants are punished harder than native 
respondents. Alternatively, in case immigrants are portrayed with favourable counter-stereotypical 
conditions (i.e. positive attributes), their expected deservingness gap with natives will narrow. In short, 
this model suggests that favourable deservingness attributes suppress the effect of identity on 
perceptions of welfare deservingness. This finding has also been discovered in a recent study by 




3. Large-N Vignette Experiment 
 
3.1. A Vignette Experiment 
 
The depth of deservingness theory requires an innovative empirical design. We need to assess the 
relevance of a large number of attributes that might explain the deservingness gap between natives 
and immigrants. Moreover, we need to study these attributes in various potential combinations to test 
whether the deservingness gap can be overcome via moderating effects of counter-stereotypical 
attributes. Finally, we need to exclude the risk of endogeneity (i.e., reverse causality). For these 
purposes we conducted a vignette experiment, with vignettes of unprecedented detail.  
 
Vignettes assess responses to attributes in specific circumstances rather than more general value-based 
attitudes in common survey battery items. Specifically, the vignettes in this study focus on 
respondents’ perceptions of others’ deservingness for unemployment benefits. Unemployment 
benefits are an important aspect of welfare protection (Pierson, 1996) but most in danger of losing 
                                                 
2 Puzzling is that Peffley et al. (1997) did not find such effect for the ‘immigrant’-attribute. 
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support due to immigration (Brady & Finnigan, 2014). Although the Dutch welfare state is a hybrid 
mix of continental and social-democratic elements (Arts & Gelissen, 2002), universality prevails in law 
on unemployment benefits. The unemployed are granted 70 percent of their latest income (after a 
two-month transition period in which they receive 75 percent), under the conditions that they have 
worked for at least 26 weeks, reside in the Netherlands and is not culpable for unemployment. In 
return, the beneficiaries are obliged to actively seek for work. 
 
Within an otherwise standardized vignette, we introduced respondents to an unemployed resident of 
the Netherlands with a mix of nine randomly inserted attributes. The unemployed is fixed to have 
worked as a tiler in a medium-sized company. The gender of the unemployed is fixed to male in order 
to reduce gender biases.3 The dependent variable regards whether the unemployed resident described 
in the vignette should (1) receive more than 70 percent of one’s latest income, (2) 70 percent of one’s 
latest income, (3) less than 70 percent of one’s latest income, or (4) not being entitled to 
unemployment provisions. Each vignette was introduced by: “In the Netherlands, the unemployed receive 70 
percent of the latest income after having been laid off. The government wants to reform the unemployment provisions. We 
want to know in which situation you think the unemployed should be granted unemployment benefits.” We closed 
each vignette with the question: “To what extent should this person ACCORDING TO YOU be entitled to 
unemployment benefits?” 
 
The nine attributes are loosely defined around the five deservingness criteria (heuristics) defined 
above. We balanced the operationalization of these criteria against socially relevant and objectively 
measurable attributes, and in line with previous theoretical reflections concerning welfare 
deservingness (van Oorschot, 2000). Methodological advances (Hainmueller et al., 2013) showed that 
experiments with few attributes might induce bias because deservingness perceptions would be based 
on omitted information; alternatively, offering many attributes might overwhelm respondents, making 
it possible that some are not even thoroughly considered. The recommendation is nevertheless that 
all theoretically relevant deservingness criteria should be considered (Hainmueller et al., 2013). 
 
Identity is proxied first and foremost by country of origin. The set of countries is chosen to be diverse, 
relevant to Dutch society, and outside the European Union (as the inclusion of hypothetical claimants 
from other EU countries would further complicate our experiment). With each country of origin, we 
manipulate the name of the recipient, to ensure that respondents understand the vignette as a person 
rather than an abstract generalization. These names are chosen to be typical for the country of origin 
but otherwise socio-politically neutral. ‘Daan from the Netherlands’ serves as control condition. In 
                                                 
3 Men are conventionally considered to be the main breadwinners in Dutch society, making studying support for 
unemployment benefits to them the most conservative test. Adding gender to the experiment would double the number 
of possible combinations to 7344, lowering the statistical power of the analyses. 
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close proximity are ‘Riza from Kosovo’ (a recent immigration country) and ‘Aron from Surinam’ (a 
former Dutch colony, with citizens speaking predominantly Dutch). More distant are ‘Mohammed 
from Morocco’ (a common country of origin in the Netherlands since the 1970s) and most distant is 
‘Mullah from Afghanistan’. Second, because we expect that support increases with immigrants’ length 
of residence (because they are more ‘like us’), we manipulate immigrants’ length of stay (expecting that 
length of residence is positively associated with (perceived) integration); 12 years is put forward as the 
most and 5 years as the least deserving condition. 
 
Need is tested by, on the one hand, the unemployed latest net salary, for which we differentiate between 
1,100 euro and 1,800 euro, with the former as the most needy condition. These salaries are in line with 
the job description in the vignette. Additionally, we introduce family size, varying from being childless 
(less need) to two children and four children (most in need). 
 
Control is operationalized twofold. First, original motives for migration are the status of political 
refugee (no control) and the status of a migrant out of economic considerations (full control).4 Second, 
for the reasons for unemployment, we distinguish between unemployment due to company 
reorganization (no control) and due to an unprofessional work attitude (full control). 
 
Reciprocity inspired various conditions. First, we differentiate by labour market consistency between 
those who have been continuously employed (high on reciprocity) and those who have been without 
a job before (low on reciprocity). Secondly, we take age into account, expecting that people of older 
age have contributed more to society than younger residents, distinguishing between 56 years old (high 
on reciprocity), 43 years old, and 31 years old (low reciprocity). Our operationalization of attitude mixes 
with reciprocity: we look at labour market integration strategies, where we distinguish between not 
looking for a job (unfavourable), actively looking for a job (reciprocity), and actively looking for a job 
and engaging in voluntary work in the meantime (reciprocity and favourable attitude).  
 
  
                                                 
4 Evidently, this attribute is not offered in combination with control condition “Daan from the Netherlands”. 
9 
 
Table 1. Operationalization of the Five Deservingness Criteria 
Criterion Operationalization Attributes (expected effect) 
Identity Foreign origin Daan from Netherlands (+) 
Riza from Kosovo (-) 
Aron from Surinam (-) 
Mohammed from Morocco (-) 
Mullah from Afghanistan (-) 
 Length of residence 12 years (+) 
5 years (-) 
Need Latest net salary 1,100 euro (+) 
1,800 euro (-) 
 Family size Four children (+) 
Two children 
Childless (-) 
Control Motivation for migration Political refugee (+) 
Economic migrant (-) 
 Reason for unemployment Company reorganization (+) 
Unprofessional work attitude (-) 
Reciprocity Labor market consistency Continuously employed (+) 
Been without a job before (-) 
 Reintegration strategy Actively looking for a job (+) 
Not looking for a job (-) 
Attitude Reintegration strategy (c’ted) Actively looking for a job and volunteering (+) 
Note: The sign between brackets denotes the expected direction of the effect on perceived welfare deservingness. 
 
The empirical operationalization of the theoretical deservingness criteria is not always as clear-cut as 
we would ideally prefer. Attitude, for instance, is somewhat intertwined with reciprocity. Similarly, 
family size may not only represent need but also identity, as immigrants – particularly from non-EU 
countries – have averagely higher fertility rates compared than natives (e.g. Stonawski et al., 2015). 
However, for the integrity and consistency of the experiment, we limited the operationalization of 
these deservingness criteria to potentially registered outcomes and actions. Consequently, we did not 
further specify the vignettes by assigning subjective attitudes and intentions, even though that would 







This combination of nine attributes (varying between 2 and 5 conditions each) adds up to 3,672 strictly 
randomized combinations. The randomization of conditions over vignettes ensures that the weight of 
a specific deservingness heuristics can be tested. To illustrate the randomized use of nine different 
deservingness criteria, we show two different vignettes that actually have been offered to respondents. 
The most favourable vignette (i.e. the unemployed with the most favourable criteria) reads as follows: 
 
Daan from the Netherlands is a 56-year old man. He is married and has four children. 
Since the age of 22, he has been employed continuously. The past four years, he worked 
as a tiler in a medium-sized company and his monthly net income was 1,100 euro net. He 
has been fired because of a company reorganization and is currently on unemployment 
benefits. After five months, he combines job-seeking with voluntary work; he still has 
found no job. 
 
This condition consists of a native Dutch (close proximity), of older age (high on reciprocity) and 
having four children (high need), with a consistent labour market trajectory (high on reciprocity) but 
a rather low income (high need), laid off because of reorganization (no control) and combines looking 
for a job with voluntary work (high on reciprocity and attitude).  
 
By contrast, the least deserving vignette is the following: 
 
Mullah from Afghanistan is a 31 year old man who arrived in the Netherlands 5 years ago 
out of economic considerations. He is married and childless. Since the age of 22, he has 
been more without a job. The past four years, he worked as a tiler in a medium-sized 
company and his monthly net income was 1,800 euro net. He has been fired because of 
an unfavourable work attitude and is currently on unemployment benefit. After five 
months, he is still not looking for a job; he still has found no job. 
 
This vignette combines an immigrant from a culturally distant society who came to the Netherlands 
with economic motives (high control). He is rather young (low on reciprocity) and childless (low need), 
with an inconsistent labour market trajectory (low on reciprocity), a rather high income (low need), 
unfavourable work attitudes (high control) and lacking effort to seek reemployment (low attitude). 
 
The use of nine varying criteria in 3,672 combinations runs the risk that respondents cannot see the 
wood for the trees, as they are asked to balance too much information. This could induce small effects 




3.3. Data and Design 
 
Our large set of attribute combinations requires a similarly large sample of respondents. Given these 
demands, we embedded our vignette experiment in a wave of the EenVandaag Opinion Panel 
(hereafter: 1VOP), organized by the Dutch public daily news show EenVandaag. Each 1VOP wave 
covers the large number of respondents (on average about 25,000), necessary to cover all combinations 
of attributes. The panel consists of a large and broad cross-section of the Dutch electorate. Despite 
biases towards men, the higher educated and socio-politically interested,5 this broad cross-section of 
Dutch respondents boosts external validity compared to, for instance, student samples. Moreover, 
1VOP members are not used to participate in experimental studies.6  
 
To minimize social desirability, we opted for a between-persons over a within-person design. A within-
person vignette design presents the same respondent with different vignettes. Consequently, the 
central comparison in the analysis revolves around the extent to which each respondent offers similar 
or different answers to subsequent vignettes. A risk in such designs is benchmarking or rationalization. 
The first vignette may then affect answers to the second one, either because the first functions as a 
benchmark (to which the other is favourably or unfavourably compared, because of the previous 
vignette) or because respondents actively seek to make their answers consistent. A between-person 
vignette design offers each respondent one completely randomized vignette. The central analytical 
comparison is then the extent to which different respondents offer similar or different answers to 
their single vignette. The advantage is that it is more likely to tap into less cognitive processes.  
 
The between-persons comparison is only enabled by the successful randomization of attributes over 
vignettes and vignettes over respondents. We confirmed that randomization was successful by 
comparing the demographic composition of the groups that were assigned to different treatments on 
each attribute.7 To further exclude any potential influence of respondent attributes, we control our 
models for a range of other determinants of welfare preferences (cf. van Oorschot et al., 2012): gender, 
age, income, employment status, housing type, and level of education. As is to be expected from our 
randomization procedure, the inclusion of these controls do not affect our findings. 
 
                                                 
5 The panel is based on self-application; respondents are invited to participate in each wave by e-mail. 
6 Their unfamiliarity with experimental study was emphasized in the fact that we received 36 complaints (among one 
complaint filed at the official Internet Discrimination Hotline) about supposedly underlying prejudices. Respondents 
who contacted 1VOP were debriefed. 
7 The proportional monovariate distribution over the attributes confirms the successful randomization: an attribute with 
five conditions shows that each condition was offered to approximately 20 percent of the respondents. 
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The experiment took place from 10 to 13 March 2014. After excluding respondents from non-Dutch 
origins and respondents from abroad, the final sample size is 23,015 respondents. We checked the 
time that respondents spent on the vignettes, and tested the robustness of our findings to the in- or 





4.1. The Importance of Three Attributes 
 
Because of successful randomization of the vignettes, descriptive results are highly informative. Figure 
1 provides these results. Across the whole pool of vignettes (with more and less favourable attributes) 
49.8% of the respondents prefer the lawful status quo, i.e., considering the beneficiary to receive 70 
per cent of the latest income. Whereas 14.9% thinks the beneficiary ought to be entitled to more than 
the 70 percent threshold, 19.6% prefers lower unemployment benefits, and 15.8% proposes no 
unemployment benefits whatsoever. 
 
Figure 1 breaks down this preference by attributes. Surprisingly, preference for the status quo (70 per 
cent of one’s last income) is very stable regardless of attribute, but large variation exists among the 
other options. Three attributes stand out.  
 
The third largest difference is caused by country of birth. The Dutch beneficiary should receive more 
than 70 per cent of unemployment benefits according to 25.7% of the respondents. For those born 
in other countries this varies between 11.1% (Morocco) and 14.1% (Surinam). Concurrently, whereas 
24.9% proposes to give the native Dutch beneficiary less or no welfare provisions, this share increases 
to 35.3% (Surinamese) to 39.7% (Kosovan) in the immigrant conditions. In spite of these small 
differences, we do not find a strong ethnic hierarchy, which is in line with Kootstra’s (2016) finding 
for the Netherlands (although she discovered a clear hierarchy in the UK). 
 
The second largest difference is the consequence of cause of unemployment. Those fired because of 
their own poor work ethos should be entitled to less than 70 per cent according to 25.5% of the 
respondents, or to no benefits at all according to 20.9%. By contrast, those fired because of a company 
reorganization should be entitled to less than 70 per cent according to 13.7% of the respondents, or 
to no benefits at all to 10.6%. This is a total difference of 22.1 percentage points. 
 
The most important difference is caused by labour market reintegration strategies. Among those 
beneficiaries who are actively looking for a job, 18.7% of the respondents proposes unemployment 
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benefits higher, and 22.2% benefits lower than 70%. Among those who are actively looking for a job 
and volunteering, these figures are quite similar with 18.6% and 24.4%, respectively. However, those 
who are not actively looking for a job can count on little sympathy: only 7.4% of the respondents 
proposes higher unemployment benefits, compared to 59.3% who wants lower unemployment 
benefits. 
 
Figure 1. Preferred Levels of Unemployment Provision, by 9 Deservingness Attributes 
 
 
Table 2 provides the outcomes of a multivariate multinomial test of these effects, controlling for all 
recipient attributes as well as a range of respondent characteristics. Essentially, the multivariate test 
provides the same information, confirming the successful randomization at two stages of the 
experiment. All recipient attributes show significant effects, but only a few provoke the most substantially 





Table 2. Multivariate Effects of Deservingness Criteria on Preferred Levels of Unemployment 
Provisions (Reference: 70% of income) 
 > 70% of income < 70% of income No provision 
b SE b SE b SE 




































Length of stay 
- 5 years 














- 1,800 euro 














- no children 
- 2 children 




















- Economic migrant 













Cause of unemployment 
- Reorganization 













Labor market trajectory 
- Previously unemployed 













Labor market reintegration 
strategy 
- Job-seeking & volunteering 
- Job-seeking 




















- Young age 
- Middle age 



















* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Entries represent the result of a multinomial regression analysis. Models control 
for respondents’ demographic and labor market characteristics: gender, age, country of birth, income, daily activity, 
housing type, level of education. 
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In sum, the analyses indicate that three attributes strongly condition preferences for entitlement to 
unemployment provision: an active labour market strategy for reintegration, externality of the cause 
of unemployment, and country of origin. Two of these three characteristics are already proscribed by 
law, highlighting the importance of individual responsibility and reciprocity: unemployment should 
not be culpable, and the unemployed should actively look for a new job in order to receive 
unemployment benefits. Only nativity is not embedded in law as a favourable deservingness criterion. 
Rather the contrary, as the Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution forbids discrimination. Moreover, 
country of origin is the only ascribed welfare claimant attribute we enclosed in the experiment. 
Combined, our study confirms that country of birth is a socially relevant deservingness attribute in 
public opinion. 
 
4.2. The Insurmountable Immigrant Penalty 
 
Next, we test to what extent immigrants are able to close the deservingness gap with native recipients, 
when their behaviour goes against prejudiced ideas. Table 3 focuses on two conditions that particularly 
stood out in Figure 1 and Table 2: cause of unemployment and labour market reintegration strategies. 
If immigrants are able to overcome the immigrant penalty, we should find a smaller deservingness gap 
with natives among those fired for external reasons and those who actively look for a job. If the 
immigrant penalty is inevitable, we should find that such favourable deservingness criteria do not make 
immigrants more equally deserving of welfare provisions to native Dutch.  
 
The upper panel in Table 3 tests the moderating effect of cause of unemployment. No consistent, 
significant moderation takes place. External causes of unemployment do not make immigrants more 
equally deserving of unemployment provision to natives. Alternatively, immigrants are also not further 
penalized for a poor work ethos either. There is only one significant moderating effect: Surinamese 
migrants fired because of a reorganization are treated somewhat more equally to native Dutch citizens 
fired for the same reason. 
 
The bottom panel in Table 3 shows whether immigrants’ active labour market reintegration strategies 
makes them more equally deserving of welfare benefits as natives. Surprisingly, the results show that 
the deservingness gap is smaller between inactive immigrants and inactive natives unemployed than 
among active immigrants and natives. Mutatis mutandis, this also means that although active job-seeking 
behaviour is rewarded with more solidarity, natives are rewarded more for their reintegration 
behaviour than immigrants. These findings align to DeSanto’s study (2013, p. 343) on the interaction 
between race and work ethic in perceived welfare deservingness, as he shows that “whites gain more 




Table 3. Moderating Effects on Preferred Levels of Unemployment Provisions (Reference: 
70% of income) 
Model 1: Cause of 
Unemployment 
> 70% of Income < 70% of Income No Provision 
b SE b SE b SE 
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- Kosovo * Reorganization 
- Surinam * Reorganization 
- Morocco * Reorganization 































Model 2: Reintegration b SE b SE b SE 










































Labor Market Reintegration  
- Job-seeking 
- Job-seeking & volunteering 


























- Kosovo * Job-seeking 
- Surinam * Job-seeking 
- Morocco * Job-seeking 
- Afghanistan * Job-seeking 
- Kosovo * Volunteer 
- Surinam * Volunteer 
- Morocco * Volunteer 























































* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Entries represent the result of two separate multinomial regression analysis. 
Models control for all vignette and respondent characteristics of Table 2. 
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Up to this point we estimated direct effects and regular two-way interaction effects, i.e., the moderating 
effects of separate attributes on the immigrant penalty. A more encompassing test on the inevitability 
of the immigrant penalty would be based on a fully specified model. We therefore assess to what 
extent immigrants who perform well on all behavioural attributes simultaneously (cause of 
unemployment, labour market reintegration strategies, labour market trajectory) receive a similar 
penalty to immigrants who perform poorly. To ensure that our model would not be underspecified, 
we expanded the model in Table 3 by estimating all two-way, three-way, and four-way interaction 
effects between country of origin, cause of unemployment, labour market trajectory, and labour 
market reintegration strategy. We used the outcomes to determine the predicted probabilities and their 
95% confidence intervals. This allows us to contrast the perceived deservingness of immigrants with 
incremental (non-)favourable attributes with the perceived deservingness of the native Dutch welfare 
claimant with equally (non-)favourable attributes.  
 
Figure 2 shows these predicted probabilities (dots) and confidence intervals (lines) of entitlement to 
more than 70 per cent (left panel), less than 70 per cent (middle panel), and no benefits (right panel) 
for native and immigrant recipients in general, and among those with the most positive and most 
negative attributes. The figure leads to two conclusions. In relative terms, the gap between natives and 
immigrants is hardly affected by other – positive or negative – attributes. In particular, natives are 
twice as likely to be entitled to more than 70 per cent of their latest income compared to migrants. 
However, in absolute terms the gap between natives and immigrants is much larger among recipients 
with the most positive attributes. Immigrants with positive attributes are 23 percentage points less 
likely to be entitled to more than 70 per cent of their latest income.8 
 
  
                                                 
8 A similar graph – available upon request – breaks down the information further by distinguishing between all five 
countries of birth (cf. Table 2). Small difference between the four countries of origin exist, albeit this does not alter the 
conclusion: regardless of country of birth, immigrants are unable to close the deservingness gap by positive behaviour 
that could counter prejudice. 
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Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of Preferred Levels of Unemployment Provisions, Natives and Immigrants, by Positive and 









The ‘Great Recession’ and the refugee crisis heated the longstanding debate whether an inclusive 
welfare state is possible in the absence of closed borders (see Freeman, 1986). It is by now well-
established that immigrants are considered to be less deserving of welfare state benefits (e.g., van 
Oorschot, 2006a). However, the inevitability of this immigrant penalty remained unclear. Crucially, 
our between-persons vignette experiment among 23,015 Dutch participants indicates that show that 
the immigrant gap (1) holds strongly in the face of rivalling explanations of solidarity, and (2) is 
impossible to overcome by immigrants’ good – even best – behaviour. 
 
Country of origin is the third most important deservingness heuristic, after reciprocity (in terms of 
active labour market reintegration strategies9) and control (external cause for unemployment). 
Whereas 75% of the respondents would give the unemployed of native origin at least 70 percent of 
his latest income, only 60% would give the same to the equivalent unemployed immigrant. 
Concurrently, a larger share of respondents would like to reduce the latter’s provision or exclude him 
from benefits altogether. Being of foreign origin is thus a strong signal that makes people less likely 
to show solidarity. Preceding the asylum crisis sparked by the Syrian civil war and the IS-threat, there 
is little differentiation in support for political refugees and economic migrants. Only two deservingness 
criteria matter more than country of origin. When a poor work attitude is the cause of unemployment 
and when the unemployed does not take any effort to find a new job, public support for 
unemployment benefits drops sharply. As such, we confirm Kootstra’s (2016) recent findings. Both 
of these conditions are, in fact, laid down by law as formal prerequisites to obtain unemployment 
benefits, corresponding to Steffen Mau’s (2003) “Moral Economy of the Welfare State,” i.e., an 
overlap between public opinion and welfare state design. By contrast, although nativism is explicitly 
prohibited, public opinion on welfare deservingness differentiates between natives and immigrants. 
 
Moreover, other favourable attributes do not help migrants overcome the immigrant penalty. For sure, 
immigrants who have been fired because of reorganizations (to give but one example) are considered 
of more welfare provisions than immigrants who are fired because of poor work ethos. Nevertheless, 
behaviour that counters negative stereotypes does not close the gap with native Dutch at all: even 
immigrants with the most positive attributes are equally disfavoured compared to the native 
unemployed Dutch. This contrasts US-evidence on the importance of counter-stereotypical attributes 
(Peffley et al., 1997) and nuances existing research on welfare chauvinism (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 
2012), but confirms studies about the inevitability of prejudice in the realm of welfare attitudes (Gilens, 
                                                 
9 Our two other operationalisations of reciprocity, namely by consistent labour market trajectory and age are less 
relevant, probably for the reason that they are not reflected in policies concerning unemployment benefits. 
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1999). Interestingly, our study does not find confirmation for Kootstra’s study (2016), who showed 
that favourable attributes close the gaps with natives. Differences in the design of the study might 
have caused these divergent findings. Potentially, the reduced risk of benchmarking or rationalizing in 
the between-person design used in our study, compared to the within-person design used by Kootstra 
(2016), might explain these differences. More (methodological) research is necessary to respond to 
these inconsistencies. 
 
It is important to note that these outcomes do not imply that the immigrant penalty is a conscious 
decision. Because of the between-persons design, respondents do not make an explicit comparison. 
Faced with more explicit question, we may expect the bias to be smaller. However, our between-
person design does preclude the possibility of social desirability either, which would mean that the 
immigrant penalty might even be underestimated (Berinsky, 1999). Nevertheless, our study finds 
overwhelming evidence that country of origin is an important attribute for perceived welfare 
deservingness. This is the more remarkable, as the outcomes rely respondents juggling with much 
information (9 varying attributes in 3,672 combinations) to answer a single survey question. Yet, 
despite the dense information in the vignettes, we find major effects.  
 
These conclusions should be viewed in a broader context. On the one hand, the experiment took 
place during the aftermath of the Great Recession, which might have depressed sentiments towards 
immigrants. On the other hand, the experiment was held shortly before the onset of the refugee crisis, 
whose influence on the immigrant penalty in welfare deservingness can only be speculated now and 
ought to be taken up in future analysis. Nevertheless, ultimately the findings in this study are sobering. 
The status of immigrant leads to a penalty in the public opinion on welfare state deservingness. There 
is no easy way out of this penalty: the deservingness gap is sizeable (the third most important criterion), 
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